



Holiday snaps, 2021...



The background of the slide is a light gray gradient, decorated with numerous realistic water droplets of various sizes. Some droplets are large and prominent, while others are small and subtle. They are scattered across the slide, with a higher concentration in the top-left and bottom-right corners, framing the central text.


ERRORS IN HEALTHCARE

WHY THEY OCCUR AND YOUR ROLE IN MAKING YOUR OWN HEALTHCARE SAFER

KIM OATES MD DSC MHP FRACP FRCP FAFPHM

WE ALL MAKE MISTAKES

- HAVE ANY OF YOU MADE A MISTAKE IN THE LAST WEEK?
- THE LAST TWO WEEKS?

- 
- The background is a light gray gradient. In the top-left corner, there are several overlapping, semi-transparent water droplets of various sizes. In the bottom-right corner, there are also several overlapping, semi-transparent water droplets of various sizes. The list of questions is centered on the page.
- WHAT WAS THE MISTAKE?
 - WHAT HAPPENED?
 - DID IT DO ANY HARM?
 - HOW DID YOU FEEL ABOUT IT?
 - DID YOU LEARN ANYTHING FROM IT?

IT'S EASY TO MAKE A MISTAKE



SOME SOLUTIONS ARE SIMPLE





WHO HAS

TRAVELLED ON A EUROPEAN TRAIN?

ON A COMMERCIAL AIRLINE?


ON A CHARTERED FLIGHT?

BEEN A PATIENT IN HOSPITAL?

BEEN MOUNTAIN CLIMBING?

BEEN BUNGY JUMPING?





HOSPITALS ARE NOT ALWAYS SAFE

8% OF HOSPITAL ADMISSIONS IN AUSTRALIA ARE
ASSOCIATED WITH A **REPORTED** ADVERSE EVENT
WHICH **COULD HAVE BEEN PREVENTED.**

**THIS CAUSES 18,000 UNNECESSARY DEATHS EACH
YEAR**

SOME PEOPLE ARE MORE VULNERABLE

- THE YOUNG
- THE OLD
- THE NON-ENGLISH SPEAKING
- THE MENTALLY ILL

HEALTHCARE HAS **DISTINCTIVE FEATURES** THAT INCREASE THE RISK

- DIVERSE ACTIVITIES AND EQUIPMENT
- HUGE NUMBERS
- 'HANDS ON' WORK: SMALL MARGINS OF SAFETY
- UNCERTAINTY AND INCOMPLETE KNOWLEDGE

FACTORS COMPROMISING PATIENT SAFETY

FATIGUE

DISTRACTIONS

INTERRUPTIONS

POOR SUPERVISION

NOT CHECKING

MORE FACTORS COMPROMISING PATIENT SAFETY

POOR TEAM-WORK

POOR COMMUNICATION

LACK OF KNOWLEDGE

LACK OF COMPLIANCE WITH STANDARDS


LACK OF STANDARDIZED EQUIPMENT

OVER-RELIANCE ON TECHNOLOGY

EXAMPLES OF ERRORS

- **COMMUNICATION FAILURE**
- **FAILURE TO TAKE PRECAUTIONS**
- **AVOIDABLE DELAY IN TREATMENT**
- **INADEQUATE HISTORY OR PHYSICAL EXAMINATION**
- **FAILURE TO ORDER THE MOST APPROPRIATE TESTS**
- **FAILURE TO ACT ON TEST RESULTS**
- **PRACTISING OUTSIDE AREA OF EXPERTISE**

SWISS CHEESE: SOMETIMES THE HOLES LINE UP



SUCCESSIVE LAYERS OF DEFENSES

James Reason Swiss Cheese Model


PENALTIES OF BLAMING INDIVIDUALS (QANTAS SHOWED THE WAY)

MAY CAUSE FEAR IN STAFF

FAILURE TO IDENTIFY ERROR TRAPS

MANAGEMENT HAVING ITS EYE ON THE WRONG BALL

A BLAME CULTURE AND A REPORTING CULTURE CANNOT
CO-EXIST



WHEN WE ANALYSE THE FACTORS WHICH LEAD
TO ERRORS, WE USUALLY FIND THAT THERE ARE
SEVERAL FACTORS, THE PERSON WHO CAUSED
THE ERROR JUST BEING THE END OF A
SEQUENCE OF CONTRIBUTING FACTORS


A SERIES OF ERRORS CAN YOU SPOT THEM?

IN JANUARY 2004 GRAHAM REEVES WAS ADMITTED
FOR REMOVAL OF A BADLY DISEASED RIGHT KIDNEY.

HE HAD SEEN THE SURGEON A MONTH BEFORE WHO
DOCUMENTED THE NEED FOR REMOVAL OF THE
RIGHT KIDNEY IN HIS CASE NOTES.

THE HOSPITAL ADMISSION SLIP WRONGLY SAID LEFT
KIDNEY REMOVAL.

THIS ERROR WAS TRANSCRIBED TO THE THEATRE LIST.




ONE OF THE SURGEONS CHECKED THE X-RAY IN THEATRE. BUT IT WAS THE WRONG WAY ROUND AND HE MISREAD THE DISEASED KIDNEY AS THE ONE ON THE LEFT. THE OTHER SURGEON DID NOT LOOK AT THE X-RAY.

EARLY IN THE OPERATION, A MEDICAL STUDENT LOOKED AT THE FILMS AND SAID SHE THOUGHT IT WAS THE RIGHT KIDNEY WHICH SHOULD BE REMOVED.








THE SURGEON TOLD HER SHE'D MADE A MISTAKE AND
CONTINUED OPERATING, REMOVING THE NORMAL
KIDNEY

MR REEVES DIED 5 WEEKS LATER





**THERE WERE 6 ERRORS IN THIS
CASE**

WHAT WERE THEY?




1. A TRANSCRIPTION ERROR



1. A TRANSCRIPTION ERROR

2. THE X-RAY WAS THE WRONG WAY AROUND



- 
1. A TRANSCRIPTION ERROR
 2. THE X-RAY WAS THE WRONG WAY AROUND
 - 3. THE LEAD SURGEON DID NOT CHECK MR.
REEVE'S NOTES IN THEATRE**



1. A TRANSCRIPTION ERROR

2. THE X-RAY WAS THE WRONG WAY AROUND

3. THE LEAD SURGEON DID NOT CHECK MR. REEVE'S
NOTES IN THEATRE

**4. THE OTHER SURGEON DID NOT CHECK NOTES OR X-
RAY**





1. A TRANSCRIPTION ERROR

2. THE X-RAY WAS THE WRONG WAY AROUND

3. THE LEAD SURGEON DID NOT CHECK MR. REEVE'S
NOTES IN THEATRE

4. THE OTHER SURGEON DID NOT CHECK NOTES & X-
RAY

5. THE MEDICAL STUDENT WAS IGNORED



• 1

1. A TRANSCRIPTION ERROR
2. THE X-RAY WAS THE WRONG WAY AROUND
3. THE LEAD SURGEON DID NOT CHECK MR. REEVE'S
NOTES IN THEATRE
4. THE OTHER SURGEON DID NOT CHECK NOTES & X-RAY
5. THE MEDICAL STUDENT WAS IGNORED
- 6. MR. REEVES WAS NOT PART OF THE TEAM**



THERE WAS ALSO A 7TH ERROR **COMPLACENCY**

ASK QUESTIONS:

WHY IS IT DONE THIS WAY?

IS THERE A BETTER WAY?

DON'T ACCEPT THE STATUS QUO









10 QUESTIONS WE SHOULD ASK

1. WHAT IS THIS CONDITION (OR TEST) CALLED?

(ASK YOUR DOCTOR TO WRITE IT DOWN FOR YOU)



10 QUESTIONS

2. WHAT ARE MY OPTIONS? FOR EXAMPLE,
ARE THERE OTHER TREATMENTS THAT ARE
SIMPLER, OR SAFER?

10 QUESTIONS

3. FOR PROCEDURES OR FOR MEDICATIONS
ASK: WHAT ARE THE RISKS AND SIDE
EFFECTS?

10 QUESTIONS

4. DO I REALLY NEED THIS TEST? OR THIS TREATMENT? OR THIS PROCEDURE? HOW EFFECTIVE IS IT?

10 QUESTIONS

5. WHEN WILL I GET THE RESULTS? DO YOU LET ME KNOW OR SHOULD I COME BACK FOR THEM?

10 QUESTIONS

6. WHAT WILL IT COST ME?

10 QUESTIONS

7. CAN I HAVE ANOTHER OPINION?

10 QUESTIONS

8. WHAT WILL HAPPEN IF I DON'T DO ANYTHING?

10 QUESTIONS

9. FOR A SURGICAL PROCEDURE, ASK “HOW MANY TIMES HAVE YOU DONE THIS OPERATION AND WHAT ARE YOUR RESULTS?”

10 QUESTIONS

10. IT IS OK TO ASK THE COMMON, OFTEN UNVOICED, CONCERN OF MANY PATIENTS, PARTICULARLY PARENTS: “WHAT CAUSED IT?” “IS IT MY FAULT?” “CAN I PASS IT ON TO OTHERS?”

DISCUSSION AND QUESTIONS

ERRORS IN HEALTHCARE

OR

THE TENERIFE AIRPORT DISASTER

MEDICAL EDUCATION

HEALTHCARE IN VIETNAM

CHILD HEALTH

TENERIFE AIRPORT DISASTER

ON 27 MARCH 1997 KLM FLIGHT 4805 AND PAN AM 1736 WERE DIVERTED TO TENERIFE BECAUSE OF A TERRORIST INCIDENT AT LAS PALMAS WHERE THEY WERE ORIGINALLY TO LAND.

SEVERAL HOURS LATER LAS PALMAS REOPENED AND THE PLANES PREPARED TO DEPART FROM TENERIFE. BY NOW THERE WAS A FOG.

PAN AM WAS TOLD TO TAXI ALONG THE RUNWAY, THEN TURN INTO ANOTHER RUNWAY FOR TAKE OFF.



KLM WAS GIVEN CLEARANCE FOR THE **ROUTE** BUT
NOT CLEARANCE FOR **TAKE OFF**.

THE KLM CAPTAIN MISTOOK THE ROUTE APPROVAL
MESSAGE AS TAKE OFF CLEARANCE AND
ACCELERATED DOWN THE RUNWAY.

THE FOG PREVENTED THE KLM CREW SEEING PAN
AM IN FRONT OF THEM.

NEITHER JET COULD BE SEEN FROM THE CONTROL
TOWER





THE KLM FLIGHT ENGINEER HEARD A CALL FROM PAN
AM AND SUSPECTED SOMETHING WAS WRONG. HE
WAS OVER-RULED BY HIS CAPTAIN.

TEN SECONDS BEFORE THE COLLISION, THE PAN AM
CREW SAW THE RAPIDLY APPROACHING KLM
PLANE, BUT IT WAS TOO LATE

583 PASSENGERS AND CREW DIED





